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IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)
(

Plaintiff-Respondent,)
(

vs.

)

CLINTON ROBERTS,

)

(

Case No 16089

(

Defendant-Appellant. )
(

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATE~lliNT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

The appellant, Clinton Roberts, was charged with
a violation of Section 76-6-501, Utah Criminal Code,
a felony of the second degree, in that on or about the
24th day of March, 1978, at Utah County, State of Utah,
the appellant, with purpose to defraud, uttered a bank
check in the amount of $331.14, purporting to bear the
signature of David Farmer, knowing at the time that the
check was forged.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The court below found the appellant guilty as
charged, upon a verdict to that effect, and sentenced
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services
and Technology Act, administered
by the
Utah State
Library. Prison
the appellant
to confinement
in the
Utah
State
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for a period of not less than one nor more than fifteen
years.
RELII:F SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order reversing the conviction
and releasing the appellant from confinement at the
Utah State Prison.

In the alternative, appellant seeks

an order directing that the appellant be resentenced
after the appellant and his attorney have been granted
access to the pre-sentencing report, and opportunity to
be heard upon the relevance or materiality of the evidence
contained in that report.
STATD1ENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was charged in an information with a violation
of Section 76-6-501, U.C.A., accusing him of uttering,
with a purpose to defraud, a bank check in the amount
of $331.14, purporting to bear the signature of David
Farmer, and drawn on the account of All-Weather Insulation
Company.

During the course of the trial, held before

the Honorable George E. Ballif, in the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Utah County, the appellant elected
to take the stand and testify on his own behalf.

Under

the direct examination, the appellant testified to his
involvement in the events which lead to the charges
against him.

He substantially denied the charaes and

testified that he did not utter any check, nor write
upon
check,
nor
know
that provided
any by~raudulent
check
had
Sponsored
by the any
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
for digitization
the Institute of Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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been uttered.

Upon cross-examination, the prosecutor

opened with the question, whether the appellant had ever
been convicted of a prior felony.

Pursuant to Section

78-24-9, U.C.A., the appellant was required by law to
disclose that he had been convicted of a previous felony;
therefore the appellant answered the question, both as
to the fact of the previous felony and as to its nature.
Following the rendering of verdict of guilty and
prior to sentencing, the appellant requested that he be
furnished with a copy of the pre-sentence report.
That request was granted by the court, and the sentencing
was set for the 8th day of September.

Sentencing was

later reset for the 15th day of September.

On that

date, the appellant and his attorney appeared before
the court for the sentencing.

However, the appellant

objected at that time that he had not been furnished
a copy of the pre-sentence report and had not been given
access to the information contained therein.

Despite

the objection of the appellant, the court, having
before it a copy of the report, proceeded to sentence
the appellant, relying upon the information contained
in the report to deny appellant's pleas for leniency
and to impose a sentence of confinement.
ARGUMENT
I. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 78-24-9, REQUIRING A WITNESS
TO DISCLOSE THE FACT OF HIS PREVIOUS CONVICTIOLl,
OE~IED THE APPELLANT EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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THE EQUAL PROTECTION TEST
A number of analytical tests have been used by
the courts under the overall category of equal protection,
and the test to be applied under any set of circumstances
depends upon the nature of those circumstances.

According

to the United States Supreme Court:
It is true that this Court has firmly established the principle that the Equal Protection
Clause does not make every minor difference in the
application of laws to different groups a violation
of our Constitution.
But we have also held many
times that "invidious" distinctions cannot be
enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
In determining whether or not a state law
violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must
consider the facts and circumstances behind the
law, the interests which the State claims to be
protecting, and the interests of those who are
disadvantaged by the classification. Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10.
Thus, the crucial question in this case involves
a consideration of both the interests of the appellant
which were violated when he was compelled by law to
testify as to his prior conviction and the interests
of the state which are promoted by such a law.

This

is further clarified by the Court in Police Department
of City of Chicago v. l1osley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct.
2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212

(1972).

There, in the context of

a criminal law which imposed a classification alleged to be
discriminatory by one who was prosecuted thereunder,
the Court stated:
As in all equal protection cases, however,
the crucial question is whether there is an aopropriate governmental interest suitably furthered
by
theLawdifferential
treatment.
Seeof Museum
Reed andv.Library
Reed,
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute
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404Library
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75-77,Act, administered
92 S.Ct.
30
Services
and Technology
by the 251,
Utah State253-2:>4,
Library.
Machine-generated Weber
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L.Ed.2d 225(1971);
v. Aetne
Casualt~ & Suret~

~.,

406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31, L.Ed.2d
768 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335,
92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).
408 U.S. at 95, 92 S.Ct. at 2290.
In the context of criminal prosections, then, the

Equal Protection Clause requires that whenever the state
imposes a differential treatment on different classes
of persons, that differential treatment must serve
positively to promote some interest of the state 'flhich
is rationally related to the discrimination.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that
criminal procedures are very closely tied with the
"fundamental rights" of the defendant; and a less than
completely "differential" approach must be taken when
examining state laws in the criminal context.

Thus,

for example, the Court found that a law which required
criminal appellants to frunish trial transcripts as a
condition to the processing of their appeals was violative
of equal protection principles because, under the
practical circumstances involved, indigent defendants
were unable to meet the requirement and were thus
discriminated against through the apolication of the
law.

Since the discrimination did not further the purposes

of the state in any way, it fell before the constitutional
challenge.

See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76

S.Ct. 585 (1956).

Similarly, where a law directed the

commitment of incompetent defendants on terms which were
harsher than those imposed upon non-criminal incompetants,
the Court stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The harm to the individual is just as great
if the State, without reasonable justification,
can apply standards making his commitment a permanent
one when standards generally applicable to all others
afford him substantial opportunity for early release
. . . As we noted above, we cannot conclude that
pending criminal charges provide a greater justification
for different treatment than conviction and sentence.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 729, 729-730, 92 S.Ct.
1845, 1853-1854 (1972).
The Court thus made clear its judgment that the fact
that criminal charges are pending against an accused
is not alone a justification for allowing the State to
impose upon him burdens which are not imposed upon others
in analogous situations.

In striking down the law,

the Court in Jackson recognized that a classification
affecting the accused's rights in a discriminatory
way must be based upon a substantial justification which
is closely related to the classification.
Therefore, in determining whether the State has
violated the rights of the appellant by requiring him
to disclose the facts of his previous conviction, the
Court must consider whether the purpose for the State's
requirement is sufficiently important to override the
appellant's interest in not disclosing his prior conviction
and whether that purpose is furthered by requiring a
certain class of persons to disclose such convictions
while allowing other classes of persons not to disclose
such evidence.
THE CLASSIFICATORY SCHEME
A brief survey of the relevant statutes and rules
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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of the State of Utah reveals the classificatory scheme
which appellant asserts denies his rights to equal
protection of the laws.
First, section 78-24-9, U.C.A. requires that a
witness, though not required to give evidence which
would be irrelevant, degrading, or revealing of prior
misdemeanors, must nonetheless disclose whether or not
he has been convicted of a felony.

The section reads:

A witness must answer questions legal and
pertinent to the matter in issue, although his
answer may establish a claim against himself, but
he need not give an answer which will have a tendency
to subject him to punishment for a felony; nor
need he give an answer which will have a direct
tendency to degrade his character, unless it is
to the very fact in issue or to a fact from which
the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness
must answer as to the fact of his previous conviction
of felony.
Second, Rules 21 and 22 of the Rules of Evidence
prohibit the use of evidence concerning criminal convictions not involving dishonesty or false statement,
evidence of character traits other than truth, honesty,
or integrity, or evidence of specific instances of
conduct, but allow by reference to Section 78-24-9
the use of evidence of prior felonies to establish
dishonest or untruthful character.

Rule 21 states:

Evidence of the conviction of a witness for
a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement
shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing
his credibility, except as otherwise provided by
statute.
Rule 22 states further, in part:
As affecting the credibility of a witness.
(c) evidence of traits of his character other than
truth,
honesty,
or integrity
of bytheir
Sponsored by
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
the Instituteopposites,
of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 7)

shall be inadmissible; (d) evidence of specific
instances of his conduct relevant only as tending
to prove a trait of his character, shall be inadmissible.
Finally, Rule 55 of the Rules of Evidence prohibits
the use of evidence of prior convictions to show that
the accused had a disposition to commit crimes; but
again the rule is subject to the qualification of
Section 78-24-9, allowing a witness to be compelled
to disclose evidence of prior convictions even though
that witness may be the defendant.

Rule 55 Reads in

part:
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person
commotted a crime or civil wrong on a specified
occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition
to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for
an inference that he committed another crime or
civil wrong on another specified occasion but,
subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evidence is
admissible when relevant to prove some other
material act.
For the purposes of this appeal, the appellant
asserts that these statutes and rules of the State
of Utah thus create an invidious discrimination against
him, depriving him of equal protection of the laws,
by requiring him to admit non-relevant evidence of
his past; a forced statement of a prior conviction.
Secondly, the admission of such non-relevant evidence
minimizes his opportunity for a fair trial upon the
relevant issues as compared to a defendant not yet
having been convicted of a previous felony.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
( 8)
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THE STATE AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
Laws allowing the admission of evidence of the
previous felony convictions of an accused are usually
justified on the basis of the value of such evidence
in impeaching the defendant who takes the witness stand.
However, a number of courts have recognized that the
inherent tendency of such evidence to cause prejudice
against the accused is sufficient reason to limit, if
not to exclude altogether, the admission of evidence
concerning previous felony convictions.

The United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
in its opinion in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d
763

(D.C. Cir. 1965), established the rule, now codified

in the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 609, that the
Court must exercise discretion in the admission against
an accused or evidence of his prior convictions.

There,

in the context of a statute which did not expressly
mandate the admission of evidence of prior convictions
against an accused, the court held:
The statute, in our view, leaves room for the
operation of a sound judicial discretion to play
upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular
case.
There may well be cases where the trial judge
might think that the cause of truth would be helped
more by letting the jury hear the defendant's story
than by the defendant's foregoing that opportunity
because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a
prior conviction. There may well be other cases
where the trial judge believes the prejudicial
effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative
relevance of the prior conviction to the issue
of credibility.
348 F.2d at 768.
courtLawalso
outlined
the
factors
which
Sponsored by The
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court should consider when determining whether evidence
of prior

convictions is sufficiently relevant and

probative to warrant its admission in spite of its
prejudicial effect.
In exercising descretion in this respect,
a number of factors ~ight be relevant, such as the
nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal
record, the age and circumstances of the defendant,
and, above all, the extent to which it is more
important to the search for truth in a particular
case for the jury to hear the defendant's story
than to know of a prior conviction. 348 F.2d at 769.
The rationale of Luck was further clarified in
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936

(D.C.Cir. 1967),

where the trial court admitted evidence of the accused's
previous convi2tlons and the appellate court upheld
his exercise of discretion in that regard.

The reasoninq

of the court in Gordon is instructive of the type of
justification which might be required in order to
uphold the Utah law against a constitutional attack.
The court declared:
The rationale of our Luck opinion is important;
it recognized that a showing of prior convictions
can have genuine probative value on the issue of
credibility, but that because of the potential
for prejudice, the receiving of such convictions
as i~peachment was discretionary.
The defendant
who has a criminal record may ask the court to weigh
the probative value of the convictions as to
the credibility against the degree of prejudice
which the revelation of his past crimes would cause;
and he may ask the court to consider whether it is
more important for the jury to hear his story
than to know about prior convictions in relation
to his credibility.
383 F.2d at 939.
At least one court has recently determined that
the admission of evidence of prior convictions offends
Sponsored
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for digitization
by the Institute of Museum
and Libraryon
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due process grounds rather than equal protection grounds.
Again, examination of that Court's rationale aids us
in determining whether there might be justification

for the classificatory scheme created by the Utah laws.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in State v. Santiago,
492 P.2d 657

(1971), first discussed the harmful effect

of such evidence:
A number of authorities have come to believe
that when the witness to be impeached is also the
defendant in a criminal case, the introduction of
prior convictions on the issue of whether the
defendant's testimony is credible creates a substantial
danger that the jury will conclude from the prior
convictions that the defendant is likely to have
committed the crime charged. The danger of prejudice
is scarcely mitigated by an instruction to consider
the prior convictions only in determining whether
or not the defendant's testimony is credible. To
inform the jury in a rape case that the defendant
has a prior rape conviction and then instruct
them to consider the conviction only in evaluating
the defendant's credibility is to recommend "a
mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their
power, but anybody else." As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d
426 (1968), [T]here are some contexts in which the
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of
failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical
and human limitations of the jury system cannot
be ignored.
The court then went on to discount the alleged benefits
of the admission of prior convictions evidence by reasoning
in this manner:
Despite the burden imposed on the defendant's
right to testify, we might nevertheless sanction
admission of prior crimes to impeach credibility
if there were some value outweighing the burdens
imposed.
It is apparent, however, that prior
convictions are of little real assistance to the
jury in its determination of whether the defendant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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may be no logical connection whasoever between the
prior crime and the determination of whether the
defendant may be believed.
Even if the crime involves
dishonesty or false statements, in light of the fact
that every criminal defendant may be under great
pressure to lie, the slight added relevance which
even a perjury conviction may carry would not seem
to justify its admission.
Furthermore, since the
jury is presumably qualified to determine whether
or not a witness is lying from his demeanor and
his reaction to probing cross-examination, there
would appear to be little need for evidence of prior
convictions even if the crime involves false
statements.
492 P.2d at 657.
The court concluded that the benefits which allegedly
derive from the admission of prior convictions evidence
were not sufficient to justify the use of such evidence
against an accused in light of the great prejudicial
harm which such evidence does to the accused in the
eyes of the Jury.
In a number of decisions, the Supreme Court of Utah
has declared its policy in relation to the admission
of evidence of prior convictions against an accused who
testifies.

The primary opinion construing Section

78-24-9 and applying it to defendants as well as other
witnesses is State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d
407

(1963).

There, in upholding the use of such evidence

against an accused/witness, the court stated:
The apparent purpose and reason for permitting
the prosecution to question the accused regarding
prior felony convictions is to affect his credibility
as a witness.
382 P. 2d at 409.
However, the court held that the use of evidence which
disclosed the details and circumstances of those crimes,
as well as the details of other incidents which did not
amount
to formal
convictions,
went
the andper~issitle
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extent of the statute.

As to such evidence, the court

reasoned:
We deem the foregoing to constitute prejudicial
error.
It implied that the defendant was implicated
in other crimes, none of them proven, and could
have no other effect than to degrade the defendant
and give to the jury the impression that he had
a propensity for crime.
Id.
Thus, the court drew a clear line between the use of
evidence of prior felonies and the use of other evidence of
similar nature.

The court did not, however, declare

a logical basis for that distinction other than the fact
that the previous convictions were "proven" incidents.
The rationale of the case failed to demonstrate why
evidence of prior felony convictions should be admitted
to impeach the defendant but not evidence of the circumstances surrounding those felonies, though the latter
may in fact tend to lessen the prejudicial impact of
the bare disclosure of a felony conviction in many cases,
or be equally probative on the credibility of the witness.
Similarly, in State v. Edwards, 368 P.2d 464, 13 Utah
51 (1961), the Utah Supreme Court prohibited the admission
of non-conviction evidence which was arguably more damaging
for impeachment purposes and less prejudicial or degrading
for substantive purposes than would be evidence of actual
felony convictions.
Later decisions of the court uphold other classificatory
destinctions which appear in the Utah statutes, but
similarly, without justifying the distinctions.

Though

the decisions
state
the for
reason
evidence
of
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a defendant/witness's prior convictions, they fail to
disclose why the state should then exclude other types
of testimony which would seem to promote the same purpose
as evidence of prior convictions.

In State v. Simmons, for

example, the Supreme Court of Utah upheld a trial court
conviction which followed an objection to certain evidence
by the accused.

The prosecution had elicited from the

accused evidence of a prior conviction which turned out
on cross-examination to be a misdemeanor.

The trial

court instructed the jury to disregard the evidence on
the grounds that it concerned a misdemeanor rather than
a felony.

The court, however, did not reveal why the

evidence of the conviction should be relevant so long
as it concerned a felony, but became irrelevant upon
a finding that it was only a misdemeanor.

See 28 Utah

2d 301, SOl P.2d 1206 (1972).
Certain decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have
hinted that there is indeed no strong justification for
the discriminatory treatment of defendant witnesses by
the Utah laws.

The court has recognized that evidence of

prior acts may be extremely prejudicial against a defendant.
In State v. Peterson, 23 Utah 2d 58, 457 P.2d 532

(1969),

the Court held that where the prosecution questioned
the defendant about his previous use of marijuana, the
testimony was prejudicial and required remanding the
case for a new trial, even though the trial court had
instructed the jury to disregard the statements, and
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An even more questioning opinion was expressed by
the Court in State v. Harless, 459 P.2d 210

(1969).

There, the court stated:
Defendant's argument on his second point is
that asking him if he had been convicted of felony,
and his necessary answer that he had
(fictitious
checks, and auto theft in violation of the Dyer
Act), so prejudiced his cause in the eyes of the
jury that he did not have a fair trial.
That this
type of interrogation is generally allowed derives
from the idea that there is a basis in reason and
experience why one may place more credence in the
testimony of one who has lived within the rules
of society and the discipline of the law than in
that of one who has so demonstrated antisocial
tendency as to be involved in and convicted of
serious crime. This rule is sometimes criticized
as unfair to the accused on the ground that he has
but the Hobson's choice of unfavorable alternatives:
either not to take the stand and thus lose whatever
benefit that might have, or take it and have his
felony record exposed, in which event he risks
the likelihood that the jury may convict him
because of his prior misdeeds rather than upon the
evidence as to the instant charge . . . . The
exposure of the felony record of an accused of
course does not mean that his testimony is neccessarily
to be entirely disbelieved or discredited, but
inasmuch as it is the responsibility of the jury to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, it is
deemed to be something which they are entitled
to know so they can take it into consideration
with all the other facts and circumstances in
determining what they will believe.
459 P.2d at 211.
While recognizing the weaknesses in the state's justification
for section 76-24-9, and noting the argument usually
made against it, the court nonetheless felt compelled
to uphold the statute; but

i~

is noteworthy that no

constitutional argument was made, and that the court did
not offer any justification for the provisions of the
law prohibiting other types of evidence which would
serve the state's purpose equally as well.
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rationale for justifying the discriminatory treatment
of the appellant in this case.

Far from that, the

laws seem to establish just the opposite, ie

that the

construction allowing the use of felony convictions
against the accused when he testifies as a witness is
a clear aberration in the logic and structure of the
laws of evidence.

The statutes, for example, seem to

place great importance upon the quality of the evidence,
allowing its admission only if it is "legal and pertinent
to the matter in issue"

(Sec. 78-24-9), if it established

a crime "involving dishonesty of false statement"

(Rule

21), if it refers to the character traits of truthfulness,
honesty, or integrity of the witness (Rule 22), or if
it is relevant to prove a material fact"

(Rule 55), but

denying its admission whenever it tends to degrade the
character of the witness or is irrelevant (Sec. 78-24-9),
concerns a crime not involving dishonesty or false
statement (Rule 21), refers to character traits other
than truthfulness, honesty, and integrity (Rule 22),
or is used to show that the defendant had a disposition
to commit crime (Rule 55).

In light of the sweeping

scope of section 78-24-9, which requires the admission
of evidence of prior convictions regardless the quality
of such evidence for impeachment or substantive purposes,
it would seem that the legislative purpose for the body
of laws governing admissibility of evidence in Ctah
cannot be used to justify the discrimlnatory effects
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THE INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION

Appellant therefore asserts that the application of
Section 78-24-9 to him in this case, whereby he was
required to testify as to a prior felony conviction,
violates his right to equal protection of the law.
He submits first that the admission of his testimony
as to a prior conviction of issuing a bad check,
violative of Section 76-6-505, U.C.A., imposes a burden
upon him which deters his taking the witness stand.
The fact, in that, he is subject to the prejudicial
impact of the evidence of his prior conviction while
other defendants, who may also have committed felonies,
are not required to bear the same burden.

Secondly,

appellant asserts that the rule cannot be sustained
on the basis of the state's purpose in implementing the
impeachment of the defendant as a witness because, as
applied, the law bears no relation to the substantive
or impeachment value of the evidence which it admits,
but rather admits evidence of felonies regardless of
hteir porbative value or relevance.

Again, the law

is without basis in logic or reason, since it is not
closely drawn to serve the limited purpose of impeachment, but rather admits evidence of all felonies
regardless of their impeachment value.
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FAILuRE TO OBJECT
The appellant's failure to object to the admission
of the evidence at trail will not prevent the resolution
of the issue on appeal, since the rule that issues not
raised at trail will not be heard on appeal is not an
absolute principle.

The United States Circuit Courts

of Appeals have at various times declared that there
are exceptions to the usual practice.

Thus, issues

not raised at trial may still be dealt with on appeal
when they concern, for example, the denial of First
Amendment rights, Founding Church of Scientology of
Washington, D.C. v. U.S., 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir 1969);
equal protection of the laws, Krause v. Sacramento
Inn, 479 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1973); significant questions
of general impact on the public, Toymenka, Inc. v.
Mount Hope Furnishing Co., 432 F. 2d 722

(4th Cir. 1970);

and the protection of due process against manifest
injustice, Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364

(lOth Cir. 1970).
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II. THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A COPY OF THE
PRE-SEi~TENCE REPORT EFFECTIVELY DENIED HIM HIS RIGHTS
TO COUNSEL AND TO CONFRONTATION OF THE WITNESSES.
The State of Utah has no statute or rule expressly
authorizing the use of a pre-sentence report by the court,
nor does it have a law demanding that any such report
used be made available to the defendant in a criminal
case.

However, the combined effect of the statutes

dealing with the subject of sentencing is that the
defendant must be allowed to examine any such report
and have an opportunity to rebut the evidence contained
therein.

Otherwise, he is denied his rights of counsel

and confrontation of the witnesses.
Section 76-3-404 of the Utah Code implicitly
authorize the use of pre-sentence reports and requires
that such information be made available to the defendant.
The statute states in part:
In felony cases where the court is of the
opinion that imprisonment may be appropriate but
desires more detailed information as a basis for
determining the sentence to be imposed than has
been provided by the pre-sentence report, the court
may, it its discretion, commit a convicted defendant
to the custody of the division of corrections for
a period.
By the expiration of the period
of commitment, or by the expiration of the additional
time as the court shall grant, not exceeding a
further period of ninety days, the defendant shall
be returned to the court for sentencing, and the
court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his attorney
shall be provided with a written report of results
of the study, including whatever recommendations
the division of corrections believes will be
helpful to a proper resolution of the case.
By reference to the use of pre-sentence reports, and by
the provision of this section for more detailed studies
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intention for the courts to make use of such reports.
By its explicit command that the more detailed type of
report be made available to the defendant and his attorney,
the legislature expressed an intention that the defendant
should have access to such information whenever it will
be used in the proceedings against him.

That intention

reasonably includes the availability to the defendant
of the pre-sentence report itself.
Further provisions of the Utah Code make reference
to the right of the defendant to have access to the
information in the pre-sentence report.

Section 77-35-12

provides that the judge, having discretion as to the
punishment of the jefendant, may consider evidence in
aggravation or mitigation of that punishment.
When discretion is conferred upon the court
as to the extent of punishment, the court, at the
time of pronouncing judgment, may take into consideration any circumstances, either in aggravation
or mitigation of the punishment, which may then
be presented to it by either party.
However, whenever such evidence is used, it must be
brought out in open court, under conditions conducive
to the rights of the defendant to confrontation and
representation.

Section 77-35-13 mandates this result

by stating, in part:
The circumstances must be presented by the
testimony of witnesses examined in open court.
No affidavit or testimony, or representation of
any kind, verbal or written, shall be offered to
or received by the court or a judge thereof in
aggravation or mitigation of the punishment, except
as provided in this section.
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Similar statutes have been construed by other states
to require the submission to the defendant of a copy
of the pre-sentence report before sentencing.

In

Kuhl v. District Court of County of Lewis and Clark, 139
Mont. 536, 366 P.2d 347

(1961) the Supreme Court of Montana

construed almost identical statutes, R.C.M. 1947,
sections 94-7813 and 94-7814, to mean that the trial
court must treat evidence contained in a pre-sentence
report exactly as it would any other evidence in aggravation or mitigation of punishment, and that the provisions
of the statutes for hearing and examination are mandatory.
As a policy matter, such a conclusion is recommended
by a number of authorities.

According to 40 ALR3d

681, 699;
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code
provides that before imposing sentence the court
shall advise the defendant or his counsel of the
factual contents and the conclusions of any presentence investigation or psychiatric examination
and afford fair opportunity, if the defendant so
requests, to controvert them.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice recommends that in
the absence of compelling reasons for nondisclosure
of special infor~~tion, the defendant and his counsel
should be permitted to examine the entire presentence report.
And a~ American Bar Association committee
has adopted the position that fundamental fairness
to the defendant requires that the substance of
all derogatory information which adversely affects
his interest and which has not otherwise been
disclosed in open court should be called to the
attention of the defendant, his attorney, and others
who are acting on his behalf.
The United States Supreme Court has also rendered
its opinion that the rights of the defendant often demand
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that he be given a copy of the pre-sentence report.

In

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966),
the court held that a juvenile involved in proceedings
to waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts is
entitled to copy of the social records of the juvenile
and to have counsel to examine and refute the material
therein.

At 383 U.S. p. 563, the Court stated:

.if the staff's submissions include
materials which are susceptible to challenge or
impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel
to "denigrate" such matter. There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy attached to staff
reports.
If a decision on waiver is "critically
important" it is equally of "critical importance"
that the mater1al submitted to the judge-which is
protected by the statute only against "indiscriminate"
inspection-be subjected, within reasonable limits
having regard to the theory of the Juvenile Court
Act, to examination, criticism and refutation.
Similarly, in a case where

t~e

defendant was not represented

by counsel and the trial court made use of information
in the pre-sentence report, the Court held that the
right to counsel had been violated:
We believe that on the record before us,
it is evident that this uncounseled defendant
was either overreached by the prosecution's
submission of misinformation to the court or was
prejudiced by the court's own misreading of the
record.
Counsel, had any been present, would have
been under a duty to prevent the court from croceeding
on such false assumptions and perhaps under a duty
to seek remedy elsewhere if they persisted.
In this case, counsel might not have chanqed the
sentence, but he could have taken steps to see that
the conviction and sentence were not Predicated
on misinformation or misreadina of co~rt records,
a requirement of fair olav whi~h absence of counsel
withheld from this pri~oner.
Townsend v. Burke,
334

u.s.

736,

740-741,

68

s.ct.

1252,

1255

(19•181.

The manner in which the trial court 1n th~s case
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made use of undisclosed pre-sentence report materials is
best illustrated by reference to the transcript of the
sentencing hearing, in which the record shows that
the court made the following statements in response to
the defendant's requests for leniency:
p.

3

MR. CARTER: Your Honor, maybe I'm misinformed,
but it's my understanding that the Court can allow
probation, or any other form of sentence.
THE COURT: Well, that is a condition of
probation, yes.
But probation isn't indicated
in Hr. Roberts case.
His record is too long.
He has been in trouble too much

* * * *
THE COURT:
He has had probation revoked twice
and he has had parole revoked twice. That's right,
isn't it?
p.

5

THE COURT:
I'm sorry, Mr. Roberts, but I'm
afraid as far as giving you a chance on probation
now is too late.
I'm sure that what you do in the
Utah State Prison with regard to pursuing what you're
telling me you have got to do will affect when you
can be released from there. And the seriousness
of your desire to reform your life can be shown
there.
I can't put you on probation.
I'm sorry.
I would like to; it hurts me that I have to send
anyone to prison, but I have no alternative in your
case.
Is there any legal reason why I shouldn't
proceed to pronounce judgment, Hr. Carter:
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, we have not been supplied
with a copy of the pre-sentence report in this
matter.
I would object to that.
I think we would
be entitled to it, to a copy of it, or at least
knowledge as to what the facts of it are.
THE COURT: Well, I'll order that a copy of
Mr. Robert's record be made available to you. * * *
Following the dialogue quoted above, the court
orocceded to judgment and sentencing without delay.
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Appellant contends that these procedures violated his
rights to counsel and to confrontatioD of witnesses
because of the fact that the court relied upon information
in the pre-sentence report, both disclosed information
and information which was not disclosed, in making its
decision not to place the appellant on probation.
Inasmuch as Sections 77-35-12 and 77-35-13 of the Utah Code
provide that all materials, whether written or oral, used
in determination of punishment, must be submitted in

open court for the purpose of allowing the defendant to
appraise and rebute the evidence against him with the
aid of confrontation and counsel, the appellant here
was effectively denied his rights by being sentenced
before a pre-sentence report had been made available
to him.
CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully submits, therefore,
that his conviction should be reversed on the grounds
that the trial court's admission of evidence concerning
a prior conviction denied him equal protection of the
laws and was prejudicial error.

Further, and in the

alternative, appellant requests that his sentence be
terminated on the grounds that the trial court's refusal
to provide appellant with a copy of the ?re-sentence
report prior to sentencing denied appellant his right
to confrontation and counsel.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(2 4)

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

·t(~

SHELDEN R. CARTER
Attorney for Appellant
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